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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent, :
v.

:

ADREN RAY WARNER,

:

Case No. 890226-CA

Category No. 2

Defendant/Appellant. :
BRIEF

OF

R E S P O N D E N T

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of possession of a
controlled substance, a third degree felony in violation of Utah
Code Ann. S 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1988), following a trial to
the bench in Third District Court, in and for Summit County,
State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, judge,
presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction in this case under Utah

Code Ann. S 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Whether the amount of methamphetamine found on a
vial in defendant's possession was sufficient to sustain a
conviction of possession of a controlled substance, and whether
methamphetamine found in the vehicle in which defendant was a
passenger at the time of arrest was the product of a
constitutional search.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. S

58-37*8(2) —

Prohibited acts —

Penalties!

(a) It is unlawful: (i) for any person
knowingly and intentionally to possess or
use a controlled substance, unless it was
obtained under a valid prescription or
order or directly from a practitioner
while acting in the course of his professional practice, or as otherwise
authorized by this subsection;

(b) Any person convicted of violating
(2)(a)(i) with respect to . . . (ii) a
substance classified in Schedule I or II, or
marijuana, if the amount is more than 16
ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty
of a third degree felony;
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Adren Ray Warner, was charged with
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). He was convicted
as charged following a bench trial on February 10, 1989, in Third
District Court, Summit County, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick,
presiding.

He was sentenced to an indeterminate term of zero to

five years in the Utah State Prison.

Imposition of the sentence

was suspended and defendant was placed on parole.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On October 29, 1988, defendant was a passenger in an
automobile being driven by Vickie Courtney (T. 12). A highway
patrolman, Trooper Simpson, pulled over the vehicle for a speeding
violation on Interstate-80 in Summit County (T. 8,9). During the
course of issuing the citation, Trooper Simpson noticed a twelve-

pack of beer on the floor beneath defendant's legs (T. 13). He
went around to the passenger side of the car and requested the
beer (T. 13). Upon opening the door, he noticed a cold cup
holding an open can of beer wedged between the passenger seat and
the door (T. 14). Trooper Simpson requested defendant's
identification and issued him a citation for the open container of
alcohol (T. 14). During a local warrants check, he found that
there was an outstanding warrant for defendant from the Summit
County Circuit Court (T. 15). Defendant was taken into custody
and taken to the Summit County jail (T. 15). Ms. Courtney was
free to leave but voluntarily chose to follow defendant to the
jail (T. 16).
During the course of the booking search, Trooper
Simpson found a brown vial with a white powdery substance caked
around the lip in the front pocket of defendant's shirt (T. 1617).

Defendant initially denied any knowledge about the brown

vial (T. 23). Based upon his observation of similar types of
vials, Trooper Simpson believed the vial to contain cocaine (T.
18).
After discovering the vial, Trooper Simpson determined
that there was probable cause to search Ms. Courtney's vehicle
based upon the following:

defendant was riding in the vehicle at

the time it was pulled over; defendant cohabitated with Ms.
Courtney and therefore was not just a temporary passenger; and, in
Trooper Simpson's previous experience, it was common, after
finding a controlled substance on a person, to find additional
controlled substance in the vehicle (T. 19, 106). Defendant's
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initial denial of knowledge of the vial in his shirt pocket added
to the level of concern (T. 23). Trooper Simpson went outside and
informed Ms. Courtney that he was going to search the vehicle (T.
18).

During the course of this search/ Trooper Simpson searched

defendant's jacket and found a razor scraper/ called a Widget/
with a white paper bindle tucked into the edge (T. 20). Trooper
Simpson opened the bindle and found it contained a white/ powdery
substance (T. 21). Defendant denied knowledge of the bindlef and
claimed that he had lent the jacket to a friend who might have
left the bindle in his jacket (T. 23/ 112-114/ 120-122).
The vial and the bindle were taken to the crime lab for
analysis.

The crusted white substance on the vial and the powdery

substance in the bindle were both found to be methamphetamine, a
Schedule II controlled substance (T. 60/ 64r 171).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant was properly convicted of possession of a
controlled substance, methamphetamine/ which was seized during a
booking search.

Defendant does not contest the booking search or

the subsequent seizure? of the brown vial/ located in his shirt
pocket.

The amount of the controlled substance was relatively

small, and consisted of methamphetamine caked around the top of
the vial.

Nevertheless, the amount was sufficient to be

identified during analysis.

Whether the amount was usable or

would result in a physical reaction is not the test; the
determinative factor is possession of the controlled substance.
Defendant was also in possession of a second source of
methamphetamine.

After the booking search during which the
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initial substance was found, the trooper searched the car in
which defendant was a passenger.

The search, made pursuant to

the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, revealed
methamphetamine in defendant's coat pocket.

Defendant claims

that the seizure was the result of an unconstitutional search.
Even if his contention were correct, the conviction must be
sustained based upon his possession of the controlled substance
brown vial, therefore, this court need not consider the validity
of the search of the automobile.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE,
METHAMPHETAMINE, WHICH WAS PRESENT ON A VIAL
SEIZED DURING A BOOKING SEARCH THAT DEFENDANT
CONCEDES WAS VALID; ADDITIONAL METHAMPHETAMINE WAS PROPERLY SEIZED DURING A
SUBSEQUENT SEARCH OF THE AUTOMOBILE IN WHICH
HE WAS A PASSENGER.
Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled
substance in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) which
provides that it is unlawful "for any person knowingly and
intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance . . . ."
He was found to be in possession of two separate sources of
methamphetamine:

first, a vial which was found on his person

during the course of a booking search pursuant to a valid arrest;
second, a bindle found in his jacket pursuant to a search of the
car in which he was riding at the time of arrest.
reversal based on two arguments.

Defendant seeks

First, he contends that the

warrantless search of the car was not constitutionally valid and
the methamphetamine found during the course of this search was
.5.

inadmissible as evidence.

Second, he contends that the amount of

methamphetamine found on the vial located in his pocket during the
booking search was insufficient to sustain a conviction of
possession.
Defendant's second argument, that the amount of the
controlled substance was insufficient to sustain his conviction,
clearly contradicts Utah case law.

In point II of his brief he

argues that the amount of methamphetamine found on the vial, which
he admits was the product of a legal search, was insufficient to
sustain a conviction of possession.

His argument seems to be that

since the statute does not specify the quantity of controlled
substance a person must possess to sustain a conviction, the
amount of controlled substance possessed must be a usable amount.
This position is clearly erroneous in light of this Court's
decision in State v. Winters, 16 Utah 2d 139, 396 P.2d 872, 875
(1964), where the Court found:
[The] contention that the trial court erred
in refusing to instruct the jury that, in
order to convict, the amount of narcotic drug
possessed must be found to be usable has no
merit. The determinative test is possession
of a narcotic drug, and not usability of a
narcotic drug.
See also State v. Forrester, 29 Or.App. 409, 564 P.2d 289, 291
(1977) (the gravamen of the offense is unlawful possession
without regard to quantity); Judd v. State, 482 P.2d 273, 280
(Alaska 1971) (it is not necessary that a usable quantity be
possessed so long as the amount is sufficient to allow analysis).
Although the amount of methamphetamine on the brown vial was
small, there was a sufficient amount to conduct the laboratory

analysis, with enough left over to likely conduct a second
analysis (T. 67). The trial court correctly ruled that the
methamphetamine found on the vial, which defendant concedes was
in his possession and legally seized, was sufficient to sustain
the conviction.
Consideration of defendant's first contention, that the
methamphetamine found in the bindle was the product of an illegal
search, becomes unnecessary as the methamphetamine on the vial is
sufficient to sustain the conviction.

Should the Court decide to

consider this issue, defendant's argument on this point also
fails.

Defendant's argument seems to be threefold: first, the

search was not incident to a valid arrest; second, the trooper
did not have probable cause to search the car; and third, even if
the trooper had probable cause, there were not exigent
circumstances to justify a warrantless search.
The United States Supreme Court formulated the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement in Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).

More recently, in California

v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985), the Court reviewed the
exception and noted that the rule was originally based upon the
readily movable nature of automobiles, citing Carroll.

Over the

years, the Court developed an additional basis for the exception.
In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), the Court
emphasized that one has a significantly lesser expectation of
privacy in an automobile than one has in a home or office.

The

lesser expectation of privacy does not derive only from the fact
that the interior of a vehicle is usually in plain view, but also
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from the fact that there is pervasive government regulation of
vehicles.
In

State v. Shields, 28 Utah 2d 405, 503 P.2d 848

(1972), this Court considered Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970), relied upon by defendant.

In Shields, the defendant took

$500.00 from a cash drawer behind the counter of a store in
Fillmore.

A description of the defendant was given to police in

adjoining towns, and the defendant was arrested in Parowan.

The

driver of the vehicle in which defendant was riding was not
arrested, but he followed to the police station.

Since the

driver was not mentioned in the police bulletin he was allowed to
leave, but was subsequently detained by police.

His vehicle was

taken to the police station where it was searched without a
warrant.

Defendant sought to suppress the evidence found during

this search.
The Shields Court, relying on Maroney, found that "a
search of a vehicle on probable cause proceeds on a theory wholly
different from that justifying a search incident to an arrest.
The right to search and the validity of a seizure . . . are
dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for the
belief that the contents of the automobile offend against the
law.M

Ici. at 849.

The crux of the issues raised by defendant in

the instant case turn on whether the arresting officer had
probable cause to believe that the car contained contraband.
A "warrantless vehicle search is not invalid under the
Fourth Amendment if probable cause for a search exists."
v. DorBey# 731 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1986).

State

Probable cause exists where "the facts and
circumstances within [the officer's]
knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that" an offense has
been or is being committed.
(Citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).)
The determination of whether probable cause
exists, therefore, depends upon an
examination of all the information available
to the searching officer in light of the
circumstances as they existed at the time the
search was made. The trial court's findings
as to the facts and circumstances pertaining
to probable cause will not be overturned on
appeal unless it appears that the trial court
clearly erred.
Dorsey at 1088.
The facts of this case indicate that the trial court
was justified in finding that the trooper had probable cause to
believe that the vehicle contained contraband.
riding in the vehicle when he was arrested.

Defendant was

During a routine

search of defendant's person at the police station, a small brown
vial, with a white powdery substance encrusted on the lip, which
the trooper thought to be cocaine, was found in his shirt pocket.
The trooper testified that in his experience, five or six times
within the previous few years, it was common to find additional
controlled substances within the vehicle after finding a
controlled substance on the person.

The trooper also testified

that he believed that defendant had certain property rights in
the vehicle beyond that of a typical passenger, as defendant and
the driver of the vehicle were living together as common law
husband and wife.

Defendant also initially denied knowledge of

the existence of the vial on his person.
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Based on these facts,

this Court should uphold the trial court's finding that the
trooper had probable cause to search the vehicle.
The Shields Court also held that H[i]n exigent
circumstances, the judgment of a police officer as to probable
cause will serve as sufficient authorization for a search,"
at 849.

Id.

In Shields, the search was carried out after the driver

of the vehicle had been detained and was in police custody.

In

the instant case the exigent circumstances were even greater, as
the driver of the vehicle was not in police custody nor had the
automobile been seized.

The Court stated that Mfor

constitutional purposes, there is no difference between seizing
and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a
magistrate and carrying out an immediate search without a
warrant.

Given probable cause, either course is ireasonable under

the Fourth Amendment. . . . "

Ld. at 849, 850.

Based on the above principles this Court should find
that the search of the automobile was constitutional since the
trooper had probable cause to believe that the automobile
contained contraband, and, based on this belief, was justified in
conducting the search without first obtaining a warrant.
Regardless, defendant's conviction is supported by his separate
possession of methamphetamine contained in the brown vial.
CONCLUSION
The defendant, Adren Ray Warner, was properly convicted
of possession of a controlled substance.

For the foregoing

reasons, and any additional reasons advanced at oral argument, the
State of Utah respectfully requests that this Court affirm
defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

f ] '

day of September,

1989.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Utah Attorney General

I BARBARA BEARNS^
Assi/stant Attorney General
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